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PREFACE.

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These articles are reproduced, with material additions, in the shape of a text-book of public administration; a work which, it is hoped, will prove of interest not only to persons within the official pale, and to the politicians who, as the

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reward of a political career, are intrusted for a brief period in turn with the supreme control of administration, but, likewise, to all who, by the exercise of the suffrage, take a part in the conduct of public business, and are responsible for the efficiency of its discharge to the country and to posterity.

LONDON,
July, 1876.

THE CIVIL SERVICE OF THE CROWN.

I.

"THE STATE" has been defined, by an eminent political writer* of our day, to be "the collective action of the nation." The correctness of Mr. Greg's definition of the term, under the conditions of modern life, has been verified with such startling

1. First, Second, and Third Reports of the Civil Service Inquiry Commission, 1875.
2. Orders in Council, 27th February and 15th April 1795, 23rd January 1799, 18th February 1801, 12th October 1803, 10th May 1809, 24th July 1817, 27th March 1822, 21st May 1855, 26th April 1862, 4th June 1870, 12th February 1876.
3. Calendars of State Papers. Privy Council Proceedings. Parliamentary Returns.
4. Parliamentary Estimates: Army, Navy, Civil Services and Revenue Departments, 1850, 1856, and 1876.

* "Social and Literary Judgments." W. R. Greg.

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government is the concentration of all information, and the utmost possible diffusion of it from the centre. If these postulates be conceded, it follows that authority exists in our midst for the maintenance of order by dispelling ignorance; and, consequently, that the first duty of government is the enlightenment of the community.

But government, though vested in the Sovereign, is practically applied by the Legislature through the Ministry to which Parliament may, for the time being, intrust power. Authority, exercised in the name of the Sovereign, is practically vested in the executive staff of the nation.

With the Estates lies the high mission of framing laws for the conduct of the community. Upon the executive devolves the work of their application to the units. The country intrusts to Parliament the sacred privilege of opening the national purse; it assigns to the executive the responsible duty of raising and disbursing the moneys which Parliament may award each year to the Sovereign for meeting the requirements of the Empire.

Such a machinery of government is a system of

may, doubly in his case, suggest to him the maxim *quieta non movere.* To such a sense of caution has, probably, been due the long-perpetuated apathy which has prevailed in reference to the conduct of the public business of this country.

The tenure of power by our public men is usually of too brief a duration to allow of their acquiring much practical acquaintance with administration. A new Ministry may seek to win *kudos* by a spasmodic effort at retrenchment of expenditure with little heed, and yet less practical ability, to promote efficiency of administration, as if economy, and not efficiency, were the primary object in the administration of public business, or, rather, as if efficiency were not the soundest economy; and the executive must, perforce, acquiesce under the fear of being considered disorderly by its chiefs. But such "a policy of masterly inactivity" on the one part, and misdirected and abortive attempts upon the other, recoil, unfortunately, upon the nation. Its expenditure is steadily upon the increase; and lurking, if not manifest, discontent in the ranks of its executive militates against the efficient performance of the business of the community.

To the few who busy themselves with the matter, persons naturally within the official pale, the problem how to effect retrenchment of expenditure and, withal, promote efficiency of administration, reads like the riddle of the Sphinx, and presents the alternatives offered by her to the hero of old.

Politicians and the mass of the nation have apparently too little experience of the working of administration, or too remote and vicarious an interest in its efficiency, to give much time or pains to a solution of the problem. Parliament supplies the money for which the Ministry asks each spring. The political party, which has for the time the command of the country, asserts with partisan recklessness the celebrated canon, ascribed to a general of the Jesuits, "sint ut sunt; aut non sint." The nation, for want of enlightenment, accepts the doctrine that "whatever is, is right." A brief review of our machinery of government and the rise of its administration, so far as the origin and formation of the Civil Service of the Crown can be traced from State Records that are somewhat imperfect, may afford the clearest and most practical summary of the system by means of

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in some portion or other of its wide extent, the beat of the morning drum being heard summoning the Empire's defenders to rally under the flag of their Sovereign. It is such men as these that, after a lifetime of devotion to the business of the nation, become the leaders of the House of Lords, an assembly almost unduly subordinate to its chiefs; for even within the pale of that august confraternity of eminent men, calm in their criticism of political rivalry, almost stolid in their indifference to political ambition, to none of whom can be applied the query of the satirist of old—

> "Jus habet ille sui, palpo quem ducit hiantem
> Cretata ambitio?"

mediocrity, if it be sensible, hides its diminished head, or it is quickly snuffed out of political life, or, at least, of political influence.

Investing its members with a fixity of tenure, an hereditary Upper House, by enabling the country to secure places in the Estates of the realm for men whose services to the nation in letters, in administration, or in arms, have given evidence of the possession of vigorous ability and powers which may be utilized,

even in the sunset of life, for the benefit of the community, supplies a want which has been created by the legislation of the last forty years, a legislation which has surrendered seats in the elective branch of the Legislature to local influences, to the influence of money, or to that won by adroit coquetry with popular whims.

But political power lies in other hands.

"Nihil est quod credere de se
Non possit, cum laudatur Dîs æqua potestas."

In Mr. Mill's Essay on Liberty we find the observation that "the masses are but collective mediocrity." The legislation of our times has accepted this attribute as a qualification for the exercise of political power. The masses are "our masters;" but the political sagacity of "collective mediocrity" is entitled to every excuse for not being of a very high order. Hence, too, every possible plea is admissible for elections to the Lower House of the Legislature, which occasionally startle by their eccentricity. If a constituency is to be judged by its representative, the responsibility for retaining a title to general respect lies with the electors. A sense of that responsibility

may not be very deep-rooted or very keen in the constituencies of Stoke-upon-Trent or Cavan County, or even of Waterford City. Their elections pass as characteristic with the community, teach it what spots may be considered as its great centres of lawlessness or rowdyism, and, in their results, combined with other returns, serve to afford

> "The lights and shades, whose well-accorded strife
> Gives all the strength and colour of our life"

to that Estate of the realm which professes to include every complexion of popular opinion.

The power of the House of Commons has been so stringently felt in our history, and has now for many years been so loudly proclaimed in the columns of the press, that the Third Estate may be excused for at last believing itself to be constitutionally endowed with every attribute of authority. The changes which have passed over the Lower House of the Legislature within this generation have to a great extent escaped observation. Recruited now-a-days from men who have toiled a lifetime in trade or in law at home, or in miscellaneous business of every kind in our colonies,

to acquire wealth, its ranks contain but few who can prefer any claim to an acquaintance with the science of government, and yet less to any practical experience of administration. The "copia fandi" which sways "a mad-brained senate's mood," may be a high qualification in a politician, but it can hardly claim to argue the possession of administrative ability; and yet, under our public system, it is the passport to high political office, and, in virtue thereof, to the control and administration of the great departments of public business. The two careers of an eminent politician and a practical administrator are as wide as the poles apart; but, under our system, the one qualification is supposed to imply the other, and an absolute control over the present and the future of the administrative staff of the nation is assigned to the politician, although the existence of the controlling authority is as ephemeral in its *personnel* as the most insatiable craving for change of men can possibly desire.

The practice of supplying chiefs to the nation's executive staff from the leaders of political parties in Parliament, may claim the merit of periodically infusing new blood into administration, and placing

men free from the rust of officialism at the head of the executive. But although "the collective action of the nation" is applied through the Legislature in the promotion of certain politicians to hold for a brief period the reins of power over the nation's administrative staff, that "collective action" is applied to the units of the community through its executive; and, consequently, such acts of the Government as touch the administration of public business require the closest scrutiny from the nation. The conduct of the business of the country, and the care of its interests, are intrusted to the functionaries of the State; and their careers, as well as their lives, are under the protection of the community.

The American practice of giving up public administration to be a prey to political parties, is one too obviously fraught with mischief to the nation to be tolerated in this country; but even among us the permanent servants of the Crown are, so far as their interests and their careers are concerned, at the whim of the Ministers who may for the time be intrusted with the government of the country. "The collective action of the nation," applied through

Parliament, and receiving its sanction under the Sign Manual of the Sovereign, in the year 1855 wrested employment in the service of the public from the patronage of Ministers, and surrendered such employment to be won as careers for life by units of the community, in virtue of the possession of superior ability and attainments, under tests applied by the State; but, with characteristic carelessness, it left such careers to be tampered with or to be thwarted according to the whims of politicians.

To this oversight on the part of the Estates have been due the repeated changes in the constitution of the administrative staff of the nation which have cropped up during the last twenty years. The tenure of political power endures, on an average, three years and six months. A new Ministry usually reverts, sooner or later, during its tenure of office, to the system which prevailed before the advent of the defunct Ministry to power; or, at least, it undoes much that its predecessor may have effected. "Changes," says Machiavelli, in his "Il Principe," "but supply the materials for future changes." Such changes, however, are but an application of new

ideas; and new ideas, when they affect the administration of the business of the community, require to be applied with caution, as success alone is the touchstone of their practical value. Administrative efficiency is too sacred a matter for tentative innovations. The interests of the nation and of its servants are equally compromised by experiments upon the administrative staff intrusted with the business of the country.

State administration has devised two different methods of carrying on the business of a community. One of the two methods is entirely our own; the other is the system in vogue among the continental nations of Europe. Under the latter, the formula, "M. le Ministre de —— est chargé de l'exécution de ce décret," may pass as a stereotyped formula for the discharge of public business by the transfer of a matter which has been discussed and settled by the Sovereign and his Council of Ministers, for execution by the Minister to whose department the matter may appertain, and, upon his responsibility, by such agents as he may appoint.

Under our system, the political chief of a depart-

ment of State is, strictly speaking, but little more than its mouthpiece in Parliament. At his entry upon office he finds an administration provided for him; and, although he may shape the policy of his department, in his conduct of its business he finds himself under the necessity of accepting instruction from his staff, and, under their guidance and counsel, of working out his government.

A divided responsibility, consequently, subsists between the political chief of a department and its permanent staff, placing the latter under the control of the former, but limiting their mutual interference. The positions of the chief and of his staff are thus clearly identified by supreme control being vested in the one, and fixity of tenure in the other; and any undue interference of the one with the other is a collision of positions. In any collision of the kind the weaker must give way to the stronger; but to yield is no admission of right on the part of the stronger, and, in the eyes of the public, does not detract from the moral turpitude of an unjust attack upon the rights of the permanent service.

Further than this, however, fixity of tenure implies

experience; and, if superiority of intelligence be supposed to dwell in the political chief of a department of State, practical knowledge of administration may be claimed for its permanent staff. Absolute control over his department, undoubtedly, is vested in its political chief, and abolition of office may enable him to reduce his staff at his discretion; but this dispensing power has to be purchased at the expense of the nation. A reduction of the kind is a determining of vested interests, and the sense of justice of Parliament has sanctioned compensation out of the nation's exchequer, by the award of increased rates of superannuation allowances, to such as may be sufferers by the enforced surrender of their vested interests in consequence of an abolition of office.

It is thus obvious that the supreme but ephemeral power of the political chief of a section of the executive has a counterpoise in the fixity of tenure of his staff; and its exercise in an extreme degree is restrained by a sense of the cost to the nation, and of the peril that may result to the Minister from that expense to the nation failing to receive the approval of Parliament. But our public men are too keen-

witted as a rule not to recognize, when promoted to high office, the great law, which governs all systems, of the gravitation of small bodies to a larger.

A timely recognition of this principle at entry upon office goes far to wearing the edge off inexperience, and supplying the tact which speedily places a Minister on easy working terms with his department, Affability and courtesy on the one side are gladly reciprocated by considerateness and zeal on the other. A sense of his ephemeral tenure of power usually renders a Minister somewhat diffident of upsetting the organization of his department. He realizes that to him office may yield distinction, but to his staff office yields their bread; that high official station is to him the reward of a political career, but official position is their career itself to his subordinates; that removal from office would, in his case, be a grateful release from cares, but, to his subordinates, such a removal would be the break up of a career upon which they had entered under the promise of a fixity of tenure.

It has, hence, resulted that the permanent service has rarely had to reproach its political chiefs with any injury to the careers of the administrative staff of

the nation, or with failing in the protection of their interests. That service, however, has been in process of formation during a period of fifty-three years. Until the year 1822, the persons who were employed to perform the business of the nation received remuneration for their work in fees from the public, which were occasionally supplemented by grants from the Civil List of the Sovereign, or from the Treasury, when the amount received by the department in fees was deemed an inadequate remuneration for the *employés.*

Under the administration of Lord Liverpool, the staff of the several departments of public business first received pay formally from the imperial Exchequer, and became in a full sense the Civil Service of the Crown. Until that date subordinate officials had, practically, been simple clerks to the members of the Government, and were rated as first, second, third, &c., clerk in the office of each Minister. The history of the rise and expansion of the Civil Service of the Crown, as it now exists, is entombed in a long roll of Privy Council Proceedings and Orders in Council. The following pages present as accurate a

summary as the imperfect records allow of being drawn up, of the rise and growth of public administration in this country.

The Civil Service is, perhaps, mainly indebted for a failure of a due recognition of its status at the hands of the Legislature, to the epithet of clerk, which through a long flow of ages has been the generic term for persons performing the civil business of the country. The late Lord Palmerston found himself, but a few years ago, under the necessity of explaining this to the House of Commons, and pointing out to members, whose minds were leavened with ideas contracted in counting-houses, that a clerk in a public office was sometimes a very responsible official, and intrusted with duties of very considerable trust, and that the title had been retained, *faute de mieux*, for the permanent executive, without doing justice to its status, or to its duties in the modern acceptance of the term in the business world. And yet, in its origin, the term was one eminently honourable.

From the dawn of Western civilization the man of mental culture and polite learning and of orderly life, usually found himself compelled to take refuge from

the universally prevalent rowdyism of the times under the ægis of the Church, or was indebted to its training for his superiority over his compeers. Entering the ministry of religion, he acquired the degree and title of clericus, or clerk, a title retained to our own day for the religious order.

To that order, in recognition of its possession of a higher degree of mental culture than was to be found in any other class of society, the great offices of State were intrusted through a long flow of generations. The great place of Lord High Treasurer of England was held by a long chain of clerics from the time of the Norman Conquest until the year 1371. The great dignity of Lord High Chancellor, the first post in the realm, and one that combined administrative with legal functions, was almost invariably held by ecclesiastics for a hundred and fifty years longer than the Lord High Treasurership. The appointment of Sir Thomas More to the office in the year 1529, in succession to Cardinal Wolsey, broke the long series of clerks who had, almost continuously for several centuries, been intrusted with the functions of the office. During the succeeding thirty years the post thrice

reverted into clerical hands. The elevation of Sir Nicholas Bacon to the office, in the year 1559, commenced the series of lay Lord Chancellors.

It is thus obvious that the epithet of clerk, still in use with unimpaired dignity for those members of the Civil Service of the Crown who are intrusted with the administration of religious worship, was originally applied to Government functionaries in recognition of that order to which the administration of public business was intrusted in early times.

Even in modern times, the Clerk of the Admiralty and the Clerk of the Ordnance have been functionaries of high official rank, the former a permanent and the latter a parliamentary official. The modern depreciation of the term in public opinion, a depreciation which led to the suppression of these two titles, although the historic title of Clerk to the Privy Council, an office of no mean estate or petty emolument, is still retained, recoiled upon the imperial executive. The public service was powerless to procure some other generic cognomen for itself in accord with the susceptibilities of the age. But the royal Order in Council of May 21, 1855, reconsti-

tuted public administration on a new basis; and it effectually transformed persons employed in public offices from being, simply, clerks to members of the government into Civil Servants of the Crown, receiving pay from the imperial Exchequer, endowed with a status in the official hierarchy won by success under tests applied by the State, and entitled, under the pledge of the State, to a career of advancement in the official hierarchy and the service of the nation.

Apart, however, from the great offices of State held originally, and for a long period of history, by clerics, we find frequent mention of the King's Clerk in the Close Rolls of King John and of King Henry III., the title *Secretarius* being substituted for the epithet in the State instruments of the day. A distinction between the two terms of Clerk and Secretary appears to have been first created in the reign of Henry VI. The delivery of the King's Signet to a person created him the King's Secretary. This dignitary had two clerks under him as "Writers of the Signet." The records of the time give the precise items of the pay and of the board of these servants of the monarch. In the reign of Edward IV.

the increase of the King's business under his Signet of Patents necessitated the employment of four clerks by his Secretary.

The Statute of Precedence, passed in the 31st year of Henry VIII., first assigned an official status to the King's Secretary, and determined his rank; awarding him precedence in the Upper House of all unofficial Peers if he were of the degree of a baron, and assigning him, if he were a commoner, the privilege of taking a seat on the uppermost part of the sack during the deliberations of the Peers.

This Statute is doubly noteworthy, inasmuch as it first gave the dignity of official status to a personal servant of the Sovereign, and created the right, which has been perpetuated to our day, by virtue of which a Secretary of State, even if he be a commoner, is entitled to take his seat in the House of Lords while the Peers are sitting.

In the year 1539 this monarch appears to have appointed two Principal Secretaries for the work, which had to be done under the Royal Signet, and, with Tudor precision, to have laid down clear definitions of their duties and rank. This order of the King

is very remarkable. It directed that both Secretaries should be in attendance upon the Royal person when he was present in the House of Lords, but that at other times one Secretary should attend the deliberations of each House, the two relieving each other weekly; and further, that during the Sovereign's absence from London one Secretary should attend the Royal person, and the other be present with the Privy Council. It thus made the two Secretaryships co-ordinate, and created them of identical rank. This practice of the Sovereign of having one of his Secretaries in attendance upon the Royal person when absent from London, has been perpetuated to our times in the custom of a Minister of the Crown, of the degree of a Principal Secretary of State, being always in attendance upon the Sovereign when absent from London; and the equality of rank of the Secretaries has been likewise maintained to our own day, although the number has been increased from two to five Principal Secretaries of State.

Our historic records give the year 1601 as the date of the first creation of a "Principal Secretary of Estate," in the person of Sir Robert Cecil. A second

was subsequently appointed. The duties of these two great officials were confined to the foreign affairs of the realm. Two great departments of State were created for the conduct of the foreign relations of the country: a Northern department, which comprised all Northern Europe; and a Southern department, which included France, Spain, and the Peninsula generally, Turkey and Barbary. Under this arrangement the Secretaryship practically lost its original character of a simple discharge of the personal business of the monarch under his signet, and developed into an office of State. The transition is very noteworthy, as it is indicative of the gradual passing of active administration of the nation's affairs from the Sovereign to his Ministers.

The Secretaryships of State continued two in number until the year 1708, when Queen Anne appointed a third Principal Secretary for the management of Scottish affairs. The third Secretaryship was, however, shortly afterwards suppressed. In the year 1768 a third Secretaryship was revived for the management of the Colonies; but it was again suppressed in the year 1781. It thus appears that

the post of Principal Secretary of State was created for the conduct of an important department of public business, and independent of any control over it by the Lord High Treasurer, the highest official dignitary in the realm.

The duties of Secretaries of State were restricted to the work of the Foreign Department until the year 1782, when the two sections, the Northern and Southern, were consolidated into a Foreign Department, under the management of one of the Principal Secretaries of State; and a Home Department was created for the internal affairs of the kingdom, and placed under the control of the other of the two Principal Secretaries of State who were in existence at the time. A staff of subordinates was assigned to each; and thus the embryo of the modern Civil Service of the Crown was quickened into life.

In the year 1801 a third Secretaryship of State was again created for the management of the Colonies and the department of War. In the year 1855 a fourth Secretaryship of State was added to the number already in existence, for the duties of the War Department alone. In the year 1858, upon the

assumption of the Government of India by the Crown, a fifth Secretaryship of State was created for the duties of imperial rule over that vast dominion.

We accordingly have at this moment five Principal Secretaries of Estate, to retain the original wording of the Patent of creation of the post in the year 1601, all of equal rank; each entitled, even if he be a commoner, to a seat on the uppermost portion of the woolsack in the House of Lords during the deliberations of the Peers; each told off for the duties and intrusted with the seals of a particular department of public business, but available at any moment, as occasion may need, for the duties of any other department, and, consequently, having no fixed domicile in Pall Mall, Whitehall, or Downing Street; all mutually interchangeable for the conduct of the duties of the great departments of State, and all in receipt of a common rate of pay of £5000 a year.

Having thus sketched the rise and history of the great Secretariats, we turn to trace the origin and progress of the great departments of the fiscal executive, which were formerly included in the department of the Lord High Treasurer of England. From the

Norman Conquest to the year 1371, this exalted dignity was usually held by an ecclesiastic. Richard Lord Scrope, of Bolton, was the first layman formally elevated to this great post under the Crown; but, after his five years' tenure of the office, it reverted into clerical hands, and it continued to be held by Churchmen until the year 1399. The series of lay Lord High Treasurers commenced from that date, being henceforward only interrupted by the appointment to the office of Henry Bowet, Bishop of Bath and Wells, in the year 1403; of Nicholas Bubbewith, Bishop of London, in the year 1408; of John Stafford, Bishop of Bath and Wells, in the year 1422; of Marmaduke Lumley, Bishop of Carlisle, in the year 1447; of William Grey, Bishop of Ely, in the year 1469; of Archbishop Abbot, in the year 1618; and lastly, of the celebrated Bishop Juxon, in the reign of Charles I.

The department of the Lord High Treasurer was subdivided into the Exchequer of Receipt and the Exchequer of Account. Historians differ as to the origin of the term Exchequer. Camden tells us that the term was derived from the chequered cloth, with squares like those of a chess-board, which was placed

on the table before the barons, and on which upon fixed occasions the King's accounts were made up. The origin of the term is to be probably found in a corruption of the word *saccarius*, a money-bag carrier. The business of the first-named of the two sub-departments under the Lord High Treasurer was to receive and disburse the moneys of the Crown; the business of the second was twofold, administrative in keeping the accounts of public moneys and approaching the Commons for grant of the moneys required by the Sovereign, and discharging the duties of a tribunal in fiscal matters under the legal fiction which permitted a suitor to try to recover upon the plea that, unless he were paid what was owing to him, he should be unable to discharge his own dues to the Sovereign.

The first mention that we find in history of the appointment of a Secretary to the Treasury is in the employment of a Secretary by Lord High Treasurer Burleigh in the time of Queen Elizabeth to signify his orders to the officers of the Receipt side of the Exchequer. From the days of Lord Burleigh until the year 1714, sometimes one and sometimes two

Secretaries were attached to the Treasury, or to the Treasury Commission. In that year the office of the Lord High Treasurer was placed permanently in Commission; and henceforward two Secretaries were invariably attached to the Board of Commissioners, and changed with each Administration. The repeated changes in the *personnel* of these important officials during the ensuing ninety-one years entailed so much inconvenience to the public service that an Order in Council of August 19, 1805, appointed a Permanent Secretary to the Treasury, in addition to the two Parliamentary Secretaries who continued to change with the Ministry.

The Consolidated Fund Act of 1816 combined the offices of the Lord High Treasurers of England and of Ireland, which had been distinct until that year, and created the department of an imperial Treasury. The constitution and usage of the ancient Receipt side of the Exchequer merit a passing mention. Moneys paid in by the public were received by Tellers, who delivered a record of the sums to the Clerk of the Pipe. This official threw the record down a pipe into the tally-court below, where the

bill was received by the Auditors, who wrote the particulars in duplicate on the two sides of a hazel-stick bearing notches, a large notch representing 1000, a smaller notch representing 100, and so on. This stick was called a tally,* from the French *tailler*, and was delivered to the Chamberlains of the Exchequer to cleave in two, from head to shaft, through the notches. One part, called the stock, was delivered to the person who had paid in the money: the other part of the tally, called the counterstock, was delivered to the Clerk of the Pells (from the Latin *pellis*) to copy out on parchment. On repayment of the loan, the lender returned the stock, which was then placed with the counterstock. Thus a permanent record of the close of the transaction was secured. In this primitive manner the Crown accounts were kept for generations. Hence too, possibly, the origin of the term Stock for investments of money.

The offices of Tellers, Auditors, Chamberlains, and Clerk of the Pells came in time to be sinecures, and

* It is here worthy of mention that the old tallies of the ancient Exchequer were burned in the year 1834. From an overheating of the flues, the conflagration became extended to the Houses of Parliament, which adjoined, and only ended with their destruction.

their duties were performed by deputies; but the statute 57 Geo. III. c. 84, ended this state of things by ordering that the duties should in future be performed by the persons holding these appointments, and that, in lieu of fees from the public, they should henceforth receive fixed salaries from the Treasury. This statute thus determined the sinecures in the ancient department of the Lord High Treasurer, sinecures which had been sold by Ministers for generations, and which, reaping their profits in fees from the public, represented in the portion surrendered as purchase-money of the posts a part of the emoluments of the Ministers of the Crown; and it converted the sinecurists into Government officials.

The statute 4 and 5 William IV. c. 15, in the year 1834, created the Treasury and its hierarchy as they are at present constituted. This statute abolished all the above-named officials, and extinguished the Receipt side of the Exchequer, making the Bank of England the future recipient and depository of all public moneys. The Lord High Treasurership had been placed permanently in commission in the year 1714.

The Act of 1834 withdrew from the Board of Commissioners all control over the Receipt side of the Exchequer by the creation of a Comptroller-General of the receipt and issue of H. M. Exchequer, and it defined the immediate department of the Commissioners as an office of registry and supervision of the appropriation of public moneys, leaving to the Parliamentary Secretary to the Commission the duty of approaching Parliament annually for the grant of the moneys required for the departments of public business paid out of votes submitted by him to the House of Commons, to one of the Commissioners, under the title of Chancellor of the Exchequer, the duty of enlightening Parliament as to the ways and means of meeting the expenditure of the country during the ensuing twelve months, and to a quorum of three Commissioners, under the Sign Manual of the Sovereign, of transferring moneys granted by Parliament to particular credits under the Appropriation Act.

The statute assigned to the Comptroller-General of the Exchequer supreme control over public moneys at the Bank of England, empowering him to make

transfers of such moneys to the credit of particular departments upon Treasury warrants, "after having satisfied himself that the order is in accordance with the Parliamentary grant;" and it thus constituted him Chairman of the Board of Audit of Public Accounts.

This Act further empowered the Treasury to establish rules, &c., for the Revenue departments, and consequently placed the whole of the fiscal administrative under Treasury control; but it made no mention of the departments of the Secretaries of State, and gave no authority to the Treasury Commission over the constitution of the offices of the great Secretariats, or of the Admiralty Commission.

Under the control, then, of the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury may be included all the outlying departments of the fiscal executive, such as the Stamps Department, instituted in the year 1694, by the Act 5 and 6 William and Mary, c. 21; the department of the Excise, established under the Commonwealth, and formally accepted in the year 1660 by Charles II. under the statute 12 Car. II. c. 23, in exchange for certain feudal rights of the Crown; the Income-Tax

Commission; the department of Legacy and Succession Duties; the vast department of the Commissioners of Customs, which formed naturally the earliest source of revenue in an insular country, and dates back to times far beyond the days of the illustrious author of the "Canterbury Tales," who is recorded, in State documents, to have received the appointment of Comptroller of Customs and of Wool and Hide Subsidies in the port of London upon the condition "that he should write the rolls of his office with his own hand, and perform his duties personally and not by deputy;" the department of Woods, Forests, and Land Revenues, created by the statute 50 Geo. III. c. 65, and dating from July 31, 1810, under a Treasury warrant of March 26, 1811: and the national mint, wherein is coined "the definition of the mutual relations of mankind," to standards kept for centuries in the Chapel of Edward the Confessor in Westminster Abbey, and which submits to the presidency of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, as the highest officer of the fiscal department, at the historic trials of the pyx or assay of the new coinage at each coronation.

The statute 25 Geo. III. c. 52 abolished the Exchequer officials called Auditors of Imprests and Land Revenues, and created in their place the Commissioners of the Audit of Public Accounts. This commission passed under the control of the Comptroller-General of the Exchequer under the statute 4 Will. IV. c. 15.

We have accordingly traced the extinction of the ancient office of Lord High Treasurer by its being placed in Commission in the year 1714, and under subsequent legislation the delegation of nearly all the powers of the Commissioners to newly-created great departments of State. The Receipt side of the Exchequer having been entirely withdrawn from the control of the Lords Commissioners by the creation of a Comptroller-General, the Account side alone was left under their authority. The legal jurisdiction of the Treasurer was transferred to a tribunal of judges appointed to try fiscal cases, with the title of Barons of the Exchequer, under the phantom authority of the Treasury Commission, which is only recognised in the practice of the Chancellor of the Exchequer taking his seat upon the bench with the Barons upon

certain occasions. The legal section of the Account side of the old department of the Lord High Treasurer was thus withdrawn from the Treasury Commission. Of the administrative business of this side of the Exchequer, the duties in connection with the pricking for Sheriffs, recovery of feudal dues and assessment of tithes, first-fruits, &c., due to the Sovereign as original owner of the land under ancient feudal customs, were handed over to the Queen's Remembrancer and the Tithes Commission. The ancient powers and duties of the Treasurership were thus almost entirely withdrawn from the Treasury Commission; the only work left in their discharge being the supervision of the appropriation of public moneys, under the check and audit of the Comptroller-General of the Exchequer, who is specially ordered by statute to satisfy himself, before transferring moneys to individual credits upon the warrants of the Commissioners; that the transfer is in accordance with the Parliamentary grant, and to lay before Parliament on the 20th day of April in each year a schedule of all such appropriations.

The Comptroller-General of the Exchequer is a

high officer of State belonging to the permanent Civil Service of the Crown; the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury and the Chancellor of the Exchequer are Parliamentary officials, and perform political duties. A reformer might perhaps suggest the suppression of the Commission, and the consolidation of all its work in the office of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who, in virtue of his preparation of the Budget of Ways and Means for meeting the yearly expenditure of the nation, is undoubtedly the Parliamentary head of the hierarchy of the fiscal department. A Lord Commissionership appears to be little more than a sinecure; and even the First Lordship, although usually assumed by the Premier or First Minister named on the list of persons commanded by the Sovereign to assume the government of the country, as it leaves him free of administrative business to give up his time to political work, is rather a nominal than a substantive post. In the instance of Lord Chatham, upon his accession to power in the year 1757, electing to be a Principal Secretary of State in lieu of First Lord of the Treasury, we find a practical repudiation of any theory of the supremacy

of the Treasury Commission over the nation's administrative staff. It would, consequently, appear that the inquiry into the Civil Service of the Crown instituted by the Chancellor of the Exchequer was an act *ultra vires* of the authority instituting the inquiry, and that any measure of the kind should have proceeded under an Order in Council. A great act of State created the Civil Service of the Crown upon its present footing. In the year 1855, the abolition of the patronage of Ministers over employment in the nation's service was determined on by the Estates of the realm which, through a royal Order in Council, threw open employment in the cabinets of Ministers to the competition of such units of the community as might elect an official career. Any inquiry with a view to the modification of that decree should have proceeded under a similar authority.

From the earliest period of English history the Privy Council of the Sovereign has been the arena for the administration of public business, the executive of such business resting in the hands of the servants of the Crown. We have seen officialism succeed to the personal service of the Sovereign in the conduct

of the foreign business of the realm towards the close of the reign of Queen Elizabeth, and extend to other departments of public business with the expansion of the empire. The great offices of State in all the different lines of public business were executive posts; the supreme administration of public business rested with Committees of the Privy Council, which, we find from public records, carefully steered clear of all interference with the executive. The Council of the Sovereign appears to have been divided into Committees for different sections of public business since the days of the Tudors. The records of their reigns are defective; but under the Stuarts the custom of a Committee of the Privy Council assuming the administration of a particular section of business is clearly indicated in the State documents of the times. In the State Paper Office we find a letter from Sir William Trumbull, bearing the date February 19, 1620, to Sir Dudley Carleton, the English Minister at the Hague, mentioning the nomination of a Committee of the Privy Council for War; and we also find a record bearing the date February 23, 1631, in which it is stated that a matter touching the affairs of the

King of Bohemia was with "the Lords' Committee for Foreign Affairs."

Under the Commonwealth all public business was conducted by Committees of the Commons. But the disturbance of the regular government of the country, which the subsequent decision of the nation for a restoration of the monarchy overruled, deserves but a passing mention in a review of the constitutional process of public administration as it has come down to us through successive generations. The State Records of the reign of Charles II. are more clear than any documents of a prior date upon the subject of Privy Council administration of public business. In the archives of the Record Office we find a State instrument of this reign creating four Committees of the Privy Council—

1. For foreign affairs and duties of correspondence with justices of the peace and other officers in the counties, the executive being vested in the two Principal Secretaries of Estate who were in existence at the time for the management of the Northern and Southern departments;

2. For Admiralty, naval and military matters, fortifications, &c., in all points not within the immediate province of the great officers of the two departments of war by land and sea;
3. For dealing with acts of State, and receiving petitions of complaint and grievance;
4. For trade and matters relating to Ireland, Scotland, the Channel Islands, and Foreign Plantations;

and directing that, as occasion might need, other special Committees should be appointed for particular matters, "as hath been heretofore accustomed." A subsequent decree, bearing the date November 7, 1660, created a Council of Trade and Plantations; and one bearing the date December 1, 1660, created a Council of Foreign Plantations alone. A Royal Order, dated September 27, 1672, subsequently combined the two Councils in a joint "Council of Trade and Plantations." This Council was afterwards extinguished by a Royal Decree bearing the date December 21, 1672, which further *ordered the delivery of all the papers of the suppressed department to the Clerk of the Privy Council.*

The business of the commerce and of the foreign plantations of Great Britain appears to have been directly administered by the Privy Council until the year 1695, when William III., by a decree bearing the date December 16, appointed a Commission "for Promoting Trade and Inspecting, &c., Plantations." We have seen that in the year 1768 a Secretaryship of State was created for the conduct of the business of the Colonies; but the Board of Commissioners for Trade and Plantations still continued in existence until the year 1781, when all the departments for the business of trade and the Colonies, together with the third Secretaryship of State, were suppressed, and in lieu thereof an addition was made to the office of the Principal Secretary of State for the Home Department, under the title of "The Office for Plantations," and was placed under the direction of an Under Secretary of State. An Order in Council, bearing the date July 11, 1794, created a Department of War, under the management of Mr. Dundas as First Secretary. In the year 1801 the business of the Colonies was transferred from the Home Office to the Department of War; and a third Principal Secretary

of State was again created for the management of the affairs of the Colonies, and, as Secretary at War, the business of warlike administration.

In the year 1855 the civil administration of the army was withdrawn from the control of the Secretary of State for the Colonies, and consolidated with the department of the Master-General of the Ordnance into a War Department. This was placed under the management of a fourth Principal Secretary of State, who was created for the purpose of controlling warlike administration by land, advising Parliament as to the armed force which should be allowed each year to the Sovereign, obtaining the sanction of the Legislature to the passing of the Mutiny Bill on the 23rd day of April of each year, and also obtaining from Parliament the funds that may be required for meeting the military exigencies of the empire.

In the year 1828, upon the resignation by the Duke of Clarence of the post of Lord High Admiral, the office was placed in Commission. The Clerk to the Admiral had long previously developed into a Secretary to the Admiralty, and, in lieu of receiving "such a gratuity as it may please the Admiral to

give him" out of the poundage of 4d. on mariners' wages, which was received for a long period of our history by the Lord High Admiral of England, had been assigned a salary out of the vote of moneys for the navy.

The First Lord of the Admiralty was constituted a great Parliamentary official for the civil administration of the navy and the supreme control of warlike administration by sea.

Amid all these changes and new creations of administrative departments, a Board of Trade was revived, and has been perpetuated to our day as a section of the direct administration of the Privy Council. It is still addressed as "The Lords' Committee of Privy Council for Trade."

We have thus traced the inheritance by four Principal Secretaries of State and the First Lord of the Admiralty of the business of three of the Committees of the Privy Council instituted by a State instrument of Charles II., and the retention to our day by the Privy Council of a portion of the business of one of these Committees, and the business of the fourth of the Committees appointed under that

monarch's hand, together with such other business as might have been within the province of other Committees to be appointed, in the words of the State Record, "as hath been heretofore accustomed," and which no specific act of State may have since withdrawn from the Council's immediate administration, together with that appellate jurisdiction which is the seal of the Privy Council's supremacy over the administration of public business in these realms.

With this summary of the rise of the great departments of public business before us, it appears difficult to understand what authority over their constitution or over their administrative staff is vested in the Treasury Commission. The Commission has authority over the transfer of public moneys lodged at the Bank of England to the credits to which they were voted by Parliament. The Chancellor of the Exchequer is entrusted by his colleagues in the Ministry with the duty of advising Parliament as to the ways and means of raising during the ensuing twelve months such moneys as may be required for the public service. To the Parliamentary Secretary to the Treasury is assigned by the Ministry the duty

of approaching Parliament to obtain the grant by it to the Crown of the moneys required by certain departments of the public service.

Authority may, perhaps, be claimed by the Treasury Commission over the constitution of the administrative staff of those departments of the public service, upon whose behalf the Secretary to the Treasury applies to Parliament for such moneys as may be required for payment of salaries; but no authority appears to be vested in it, on this ground, over the administrative staff of the Admiralty or of the War Office, as the salaries of the Admiralty officials are paid out of the navy vote, which is moved in the House of Commons by the First Lord of the Admiralty, and the salaries of the War Department officials out of the army vote, which is moved in the House of Commons by the Principal or Under Secretary of State for War. Such authority may, possibly, be claimed over the functionaries of these two departments under the Appropriation Act, which connects the Treasury Commission, once removed, with the expenditure for the salaries of these two sections of the Civil Service of the Crown. But the staff of the Principal Secre-

tary of State for India is likewise a section of the Civil Service; and with the expenditure for the salaries of these officials, as it is defrayed out of the revenues of India, the Treasury Commission and the Chancellor of the Exchequer have nothing to do. These officials are as essentially a portion of the Civil Service as the staff of any of the other Secretariats, or of the Treasury itself. Against this view the argument will not lie that the Indian Office clerks are officials on the Indian establishment as much as the Civil Service in India, as there is the marked distinction between the two services that the one is local and the other imperial, the three Indian services being the establishments of the Governments of the respective Presidencies, whereas the India Office staff is the establishment of the imperial Minister to whom the Indian section of public administration is intrusted. It would consequently appear that the somewhat ambitious measure of the appointment by the Chancellor of the Exchequer of a Committee of Inquiry into the Civil Service, with a view to determining admission within its pale, its constitution and its grading, found itself thwarted *ab ovo* by the limited

power of the authority which delegated the duty to Mr. Playfair.

The Treasury Commission has been located for generations on the site of the Cockpit, added by Henry VIII. for his favourite diversion of mains to the palace which he purchased from Cardinal Wolsey, who had originally acquired it from the Archbishop of York. The building, from its new appearance, had received the name of White Hall. Even within the present century the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury addressed their letters officially from The Cockpit. The term was suppressed in deference to the susceptibilities of the age in favour of the modern address of Treasury Chambers. The sway of the Commission is extended enough without touching the great Secretariats. The authority of the Commissioners is recognized by the fiscal departments lodged in the stately palace which Protector Somerset built for himself in the Strand; in the busy Custom House lost to society afar off in the heart of the great city; in the murky edifice of the Mint, standing with significant rivalry, indicative of the new power which has *succeeded* to the old, in close proximity to the grey

walls and turrets of the Tower of London; and in the mighty Post Office built over the brow of Ludgate Hill, and within the shadow of St. Paul's Cathedral.

From the east to the west of the great metropolis is a wide flight, and to some who alight in the region of South Kensington the spectacle which meets their eye may possibly suggest ideas similar to that expressed by Queen Elizabeth during her memorable tour into the western counties, that "the further west she went, the more the conviction grew upon her that the wise men must have come from the east." In the far west of the metropolis, in a district which, within the recollection of comparatively recent settlers in the locality, was a nursery-ground sending its daily supplies of fruit and vegetables to Covent Garden market, has sprung up a vast educational department, which, in the costly magnificence of its protection of the arts, has succeeded in eclipsing aught recorded in history of the mediæval Italian republics: this section of public administration is under the immediate control of the Privy Council, but is supplied with funds by Parliament under Treasury mediation.

Situate within the great official quadrangle bounded on the north by Trafalgar Square, on the south by Great George Street, on the east by the Thames Embankment, and on the west by St. James's Park, and bisected by Whitehall and Parliament Street, may be found the offices of the Lord Privy Seal, of the Copyhold and Tithes, the Ecclesiastical, the Lunacy, the Public Works Loan, and the Civil Service Commissioners, the Stationery Department, the Local Government Board, the Admiralty, the great Secretariats, and of the Privy Council itself; while, until such time as the State shall have built itself the contemplated great office for a combined administration of war by land and sea, the War Office seeks refuge in Pall Mall in the building formerly tenanted by the Dukes of Cumberland.

In the purlieus of St. James's Square the Charity Commission modestly hides what good it does; while, withdrawn entirely from the official world, the archives of the State find shelter in Fetter Lane, within the precincts of the Courts of Chancery, in a Record Office instituted in 1840 under the control of the Master of the Rolls, but rescued from the corrupting

influences of law-courts by the refined courtesy of its staff, who preserve to it the character of a department of State. In Northern Bloomsbury the great library and museum of the nation, with its numerous officials, appear beyond the ken of the Treasury Commission; and, finally, with the mention of the staff of the Legislature, which is located upon the domain of St. Stephen's on the south of the official boundary of Great George Street, the tale of the several departments of State administration is complete.

II.

FOR the origin of the Civil Service we turn to the statute 50 Geo. III. c. 117, which, for the first time in our history, gave the formal recognition of the Estates of the realm to persons employed in public offices. Until the passing of this Act these *employés* were simply private clerks to the Minister intrusted with the office, and in his service. They obtained pay for their work out of the fees which he received from such members of the public as had business with his department, and they were destitute of any public status whatever. The fees were formed into a Fee-fund. Out of this fund the Minister defrayed the working expenses of his department, and he retained as his perquisite any balance that was left.

For a long period of history the emoluments of Ministers were derived from poundage and the use of

public moneys in official hands. After the abolition of these two sources of profit by the substitution, in lieu, of fixed salaries for the great posts of Government, the practice of exacting fees from the public stepped in to supplement the gains of office. The sale, too, of subordinate posts became a recognized source of revenue to a Minister; and it prevailed so universally, that the appointment by Mr. Pitt of a person to the Clerkship of the Pells in the Treasury department, without acceptance of any purchase-money for the place, was a topic of universal comment at the time. Official simony, and the exaction of fees from the public, enabled a Minister to increase his remuneration to figures materially in excess of the £6000 a year which, upon the award of fixed salaries to members of the Government, was assigned as the stipend of a Principal Secretary of State. The emoluments of Ministers during the last century appear to have been profits commensurate with the importance of their posts; and it may be concluded that their interest in the Fee-funds of their departments precluded any undue extravagance upon their clerical service.

The example, however, of Mr. Pitt, who was absolutely incorruptible, checked the practice of converting ministerial posts into sources of revenue to Ministers. The practice, too, of exaction of fees from the public likewise fell off; until at last, in the year 1810, it was found that Fee-funds were not always adequate to meeting the working expenses of certain departments. The statute 50 Geo. III. c. 117, accordingly directed that, "when any deficiency of the Fee-fund should be found in the offices of the Principal Secretary of State, of the Council, and of the Treasury," such deficiency should be made good out of the Civil List of the Sovereign. The statute thus withdrew the *employés* in these offices from the personal service of their departmental chiefs, and it invested them with the degree of servants of the Sovereign. To this statute the origin of the Civil Service may, accordingly, be traced.

The Act 56 Geo. III. c. 46 is, however, to be taken as the statute which first created a Civil Service of the Crown. The provisions of this Act were very remarkable. It drew a distinction between the retinue of the Sovereign and the retinue of the Crown; it

identified the Crown of England as an institution, and it awarded distinct identities to the *personnel* attached to the First of the Three Estates, and to that attached to the Three Estates combined. It repealed the statute of 1810; and it directed that, for the future, any deficiency in the Fee-fund of a department, in lieu of being made good out of the Civil List of the Sovereign, should "be made good out of any funds which may be granted by Parliament to defray such expenses;" and thus it converted persons employed on the public business, who had originally been servants of the Minister, and afterwards servants of the Sovereign, into servants of the nation. It assigned them an official status, and constituted them into a Civil Service of the Crown. And, finally, this statute placed the royal household under the authority of the Civil Service of the nation, which was thus created, by the appointment of an official to be Auditor of the Civil List for the fiscal control of the departments of the Lord High Chamberlain, the Lord High Steward, and the Master of the Horse.

The system of payment of subordinate *employés* in

the several departments out of Fee-funds was, henceforth, gradually suppressed by the award of fixed salaries to the officials out of the imperial Exchequer; and the practice of exacting fees from the public was likewise abandoned. It was not, however, until the year 1836 that departmental Fee-funds were finally discontinued. The salaries of the officials in other departments had been previously placed upon the annual estimates of public expenditure laid before Parliament; but it was only in the year 1837 that salaries were finally assigned to the clerks in the offices of the Two Houses of the Legislature, and placed upon the estimates in common with the pay of the other sections of the Civil Service. The era of the Civil Service may, accordingly, be said to date from that epoch. The year was an auspicious one, as it was marked by the ascent to the throne of the illustrious lady whose reign has proved the most orderly and the most prosperous period in the history of Great Britain.

It would appear from the statute of 1816, which created the Civil Service, that Fee-funds had ceased for some time to yield any profits to the chiefs of our

great departments of State. The payment of salaries out of the imperial Exchequer to subordinate functionaries led the way to the suppression of the practice of the levy of these vales upon the public; but, while it likewise stifled the practice of the sale of minor places by Ministers, it left them the valuable privilege of patronage over employment in the public service. It is somewhat difficult, in these times of the ballot and secret voting, to estimate correctly the full value of such a privilege to Ministers in enabling the Government in bygone times to purchase or requite influential supporters in the constituencies. There was nothing irregular in such a practice, nothing that could be reasonably objected to in days when seats in Parliament had a market value throughout the country, and constituencies could be assessed at fixed prices. If a pecuniary consideration could pass to a voter, why should not the consideration of a provision for life in the public service for the son of a voter pass to him equally for his support? The law itself ignores a gift; and it was only in riper times that the franchise came to be regarded as a trust and not a possession.

But, unfortunately, the creation of such a consideration came to be effected at the cost of the public. The devolution of payment of salaries from Fee-funds to the national Exchequer led to the addition by Ministers to the number of *employés* in public offices for the purpose of increasing patronage. Every temporary pressure of work afforded a pretext for an increase of places, and their increase was not determined by a lapse of the pressure. No written law had placed the Treasury in authority over the Civil Service of the Crown; but, under the Commission's supervision of expenditure of public moneys, application was made to it by the various departments, upon any emergency or pressure of work arising, for permission to put on additional hands. If the circumstances appeared to warrant an increase of expenditure at the time, an addition was granted to the establishment of the department. If the applicant chanced to be afflicted for the moment with the weakness of modesty, or if the circumstances represented in the plea for the increase of an office did not appear sufficiently strong, in the eyes of the Treasury official intrusted with the regulation of such matters, to justify

an increase of the establishment, Extra clerks only were asked for or were granted. The distinction between Established and Extra clerks would appear to have been that the former were rated in classes with progressive increase of pay, while the latter remained at their initial rate of salary until they could be placed upon the establishment of the office. Both orders were alike permanent. Subsequently, for the purpose of affording assistance under a momentary pressure, Temporary clerks were appointed; and they too upon a favourable opportunity presenting itself, were added to the establishment. The patronage of Ministers thus extended, constituencies were conciliated. Everything proceeded smoothly enough, the Service of the Crown affording, as Mr. Bright has put it, a system of out-door relief to the poorer saplings of aristocracy, or perhaps rather a substantive definition of the value of the franchise in the constituencies which returned a member or a supporter of the Government to Parliament.

The Civil Service of the Crown became an epitome of the intellectual weakness of the nation. Families ennobled through law or trade deemed the public

service a sphere of idleness suited to their incapables, and gladly quartered them upon the national Exchequer. Country manses eagerly got quit of their striplings to a certain provision by the State, and utilized every feminine influence that could further their aim to do so. Petty tradesmen in certain constituencies, known as Government boroughs, true to the principle of barter, made their electoral support contingent upon the promise of a place for some local hopeful with aspirations beyond the paternal counter. Even the oyster-dredgers of Queenboro', not unnaturally desirous of securing a more comfortable career in life for their sons, exacted it in the public service from their nominees to Parliament.

This state of things proceeded upon the principle that nothing is given in this world for nothing. The service of the community became a close corporation, one into which admission was possible to a small section only of the public, a corporation of which little or nothing was known to the outside world. Matters, however, went on smoothly enough for a time; but the Crimean War burst upon the country,

and roused it from its lethargy. To its dismay the nation found

"Scabros nigræ morsu rubiginis enses."

An impetus was given to inquiry into public administration; and, as the result, "the collective action of the nation" by a great measure of State, laid before the House of Commons and passed on to the Throne, embodied in the historic Order in Council of the 21st May, 1855, the solemn edict of the nation, that public employ should in future be the service of the country, and that the right to employment under the Crown should be, henceforth, vested in the community, and admitted, in the case of individuals, only in virtue of the possession of superior capacity and attainments recognized under tests applied by the State.

The measure was a wise and a statesmanlike act. For, if State administration be the carrying out of "the collective action of the nation," it is both a peril and a discredit to the nation if "its collective action" be not carried out in the most intelligent and in a perfect manner. The nation, con-

sequently, acted in its own interests solely when it wrested employment upon its business from the patronage of politicians, and when, for the efficient performance of that business, it created a new career in social life, the career of service of the community.

And, to secure the most efficient service that the nation could command, it was naturally desirous of recruiting the most promising and the most intellectually vigorous of its youth into the ranks of its administrative staff. But high promise and intellectual superiority in youth require some test for their detection; and the only test applicable for their discovery is competition between candidates for employment, a competition not literary only, but educational and indicative of store of knowledge and powers of mind and application.

The Civil Service Commission was intrusted with the responsible duty of devising and applying a competitive test of this kind; and the country has had every reason to recognize the ability and conscientiousness with which the Commission, during the twenty years of its existence, has fulfilled so

responsible a trust. Under the auspices of the Commissioners the old practice of

> "Grafting
> The slip of coxcomb on the stock of fool"

has received a check, in so far as the Civil Service of the Crown is concerned. But, in laying down this system of admission into the nation's service and inviting the most gifted and ambitious of its youth, for it is emulation that incites youth to competition, to come forward to compete for public employment by right of proved superiority of parts and attainments, the nation surrendered a vested interest in their careers to the successful; and it incurred a reciprocal obligation for the intact preservation of the prospects offered to induce members of the community to win the right of public employment, *quamdiu se bene gesserint.*

The Civil Service may, accordingly, be said to have been re-constituted upon a new footing from the 21st May, 1855, the date of the passing of this Order in Council. The new constitution applied to all departments of the public service, and it established

the relations between the nation and its servants upon a new basis. The Order in Council recognized a vested interest in their posts in all persons who were in the public service at the date of the passing of the Order; and it created a vested interest for each person who might hereafter obtain an appointment in the service, under the provisions of the Order, by competition at the examinations held under the authority of the State. And this vested interest extended to a right of protection by the nation of the positions, the standards of pay, and the careers, which attached to the vested interests in existence in the year 1855, and were then held out to units of the community as the rewards to induce its youth to enter the service of the nation. The positions of Civil Servants have been till now respected. The standards of pay and the careers in the Service appear to have been treated with less solicitude.

We find a salary of £80 a year quoted by an Order in Council of the 12th October, 1803, as the initial rate of pay in that day of the clerks on the establishment of the Principal Secretary of State for

the Home Department. A subsequent Order in Council of the 10th May, 1809, appears, at the instance of Mr. Canning, to have increased the salaries of the clerks in the Office of the Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, "upon the principle of granting a special augmentation in consideration of length of service, and not of raising the fixed rate of salaries."

Until the year 1822 a clerkship in the Secretariats continued to be an individual post with a fixed salary; the holder attained to higher pay as he rose from a tenth clerkship to a ninth, from a ninth to an eighth, *et sic porro*. An Order in Council, bearing the date 27th March, 1822, first assigned to the Secretariats fixed establishments with classes of clerks, who were henceforth to receive a yearly increment of salary until the *maximum* fixed for the class, in which the *employé* might continue, had been attained, in lieu of the fixed posts which had previously existed.

It would be impossible to trace the successive organizations of the staffs of our several departments of public business. The pay of the clerks in the

Office of the Lord High Admiral was originally defrayed out of his profits from poundage and the use of public moneys voted to the Navy. The remuneration of the Secretary to the Admiralty, originally Clerk to the Admiral, depended upon such portion as it pleased the Lord High Admiral to give his Clerk out of a poundage of 4d. on mariners' wages. The pay of the Secretary and the clerks subsequently became a charge upon the Naval vote, and the award of salaries to them was a departmental arrangement. The same remark will apply to the officials in the other warlike departments, as their pay was a charge upon the Army votes. The salaries of the functionaries in the General Post Office and the Revenue departments were charges upon the gross profits of these departments, and have only been detailed in the Parliamentary Estimates during the last twenty years. The year 1822 may, accordingly, be quoted as the date from which the system of rating public functionaries in classes, with yearly progressive salaries, came into operation for the Civil Service, under the authority of the Royal Order in Council of the 27th March, 1822.

The year 1837 has been mentioned as the epoch from which the era of a constituted Civil Service of the Crown may be said to take its date. Statistical science was unknown in that day, or was, at least, in its infancy. No records that can be relied on have survived to our time of the retail prices of articles of daily consumption at the commencement of the present reign, and it is, consequently, impossible to present any comparative quotations of such prices in the years 1837 and 1876. The economic effects, however, of the gold discoveries did not commence to operate until subsequently to the year 1850; and during the period between 1837 and 1850 it does not appear that there occurred in this country any marked increase of the prices of commodities, or any startling dislocation of relations between a fixed income and the expenditure of a household upon the necessaries of life.

We accordingly avail ourselves of a table of wholesale prices given in No. 1698 of the *Economist* (March 11, 1876), which starts with an average of such prices during the six years 1845–50, and quotes prices in each year in succession until the year 1876,

the figure 100 being taken to represent the average of prices during the period 1845–50, and the prices in the successive years being calculated from that datum line. We extract from this table a schedule of prices in the period 1845–50, and in the year 1876.

Year.	Coffee.	Tea.	Sugar.	Tobacco.	Wheat.	Butcher's Meat	Cotton.	Silk—Raw.	Wool.	Indigo.	Oils.	Timber.	Tallow.	Leather.	Copper.	Iron.	Lead.	Tin.	Cotton Yarn.	Cotton Cloth.
1845–1850	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
1876	183	100	67	256	84	153	107	87	133	130	116	128	120	147	100	125	131	99	123	111

A table of this kind, however, is no reliable index to any rise or fall in the retail prices of these commodities during the period which has intervened between the specified years. The number of middlemen between the producer and the retail purchaser has increased during the last twenty-five years; and it may, consequently, be assumed that the margin between wholesale and retail prices is much greater in the year 1876 than the margin which sufficed to cover the profits of middlemen twenty-five years

previously. It is thus obvious that the ratio of a fixed income, say of £100 a year, to expenditure is materially less in the year 1876, when contrasted with the ratio of such an income to expenditure in the period 1845-50, than it would appear from this table. It is difficult to find any approximate measure of the two ratios. The safest and the severest measure that suggests itself, in the dearth of information as to retail prices in the period 1845-50, is the bank-note circulation of the United Kingdom, inasmuch as the bank-note circulation represents the greater or less abundance of money in the country, and abundance of money affects the value, both socially and practically, of a fixed income, say of £100 a year. In the table given in the number of the *Economist* to which we have referred, we find against the datum line of 100 for the period 1845-50, a bank-note circulation of 130 in the year 1876. It would consequently appear that the value of a fixed income has been depreciated 30 per cent. during the last twenty-five years, if the bank-note standard be accepted as an accurate measure of the values of a fixed income in the period 1845-50 and in the year 1876.

sequently, acted in its own interests solely when it wrested employment upon its business from the patronage of politicians, and when, for the efficient performance of that business, it created a new career in social life, the career of service of the community.

And, to secure the most efficient service that the nation could command, it was naturally desirous of recruiting the most promising and the most intellectually vigorous of its youth into the ranks of its administrative staff. But high promise and intellectual superiority in youth require some test for their detection; and the only test applicable for their discovery is competition between candidates for employment, a competition not literary only, but educational and indicative of store of knowledge and powers of mind and application.

The Civil Service Commission was intrusted with the responsible duty of devising and applying a competitive test of this kind; and the country has had every reason to recognize the ability and conscientiousness with which the Commission, during the twenty years of its existence, has fulfilled so

responsible a trust. Under the auspices of the Commissioners the old practice of

> "Grafting
> The slip of coxcomb on the stock of fool"

has received a check, in so far as the Civil Service of the Crown is concerned. But, in laying down this system of admission into the nation's service and inviting the most gifted and ambitious of its youth, for it is emulation that incites youth to competition, to come forward to compete for public employment by right of proved superiority of parts and attainments, the nation surrendered a vested interest in their careers to the successful; and it incurred a reciprocal obligation for the intact preservation of the prospects offered to induce members of the community to win the right of public employment, *quamdiu se bene gesserint.*

The Civil Service may, accordingly, be said to have been re-constituted upon a new footing from the 21st May, 1855, the date of the passing of this Order in Council. The new constitution applied to all departments of the public service, and it established

the relations between the nation and its servants upon a new basis. The Order in Council recognized a vested interest in their posts in all persons who were in the public service at the date of the passing of the Order; and it created a vested interest for each person who might hereafter obtain an appointment in the service, under the provisions of the Order, by competition at the examinations held under the authority of the State. And this vested interest extended to a right of protection by the nation of the positions, the standards of pay, and the careers, which attached to the vested interests in existence in the year 1855, and were then held out to units of the community as the rewards to induce its youth to enter the service of the nation. The positions of Civil Servants have been till now respected. The standards of pay and the careers in the Service appear to have been treated with less solicitude.

We find a salary of £80 a year quoted by an Order in Council of the 12th October, 1803, as the initial rate of pay in that day of the clerks on the establishment of the Principal Secretary of State for

the Home Department. A subsequent Order in Council of the 10th May, 1809, appears, at the instance of Mr. Canning, to have increased the salaries of the clerks in the Office of the Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, "upon the principle of granting a special augmentation in consideration of length of service, and not of raising the fixed rate of salaries."

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vice has comprised the grades of Secretary and Clerks from the days of Henry VI., if not from the Conquest. This hierarchy of the Civil Service of the Crown thus dates from times in which the progenitors of those who would apply the terms of Principal and Assistant to the Civil Service of the Crown, and give the cast of a linendraper's establishment to a department of State administration, were living upon acorns.

With the growth of public departments, the grade of Clerk has been subdivided into the official degrees of Chief Clerk, Senior Clerk, and Junior Clerk, the two last-mentioned orders of Civil Servants being rated in classes under the system inaugurated by the Order in Council of 27th March, 1822.

The employment of Temporary Clerks appears to have been discontinued upon the reconstitution of the Civil Service in the year 1856. The nature of temporary employment is indicative of such employment being given for the performance of simply elementary work. With the discontinuance of the appointment of Temporary Clerks, it appears, accordingly, to have become the practice for our public departments to hire labour for the performance of simply clerical duties from

a firm of law-stationers. The firm received the money from the hiring department, and settled with the hands which had been employed under its contract. This practice, however, was determined by the Order in Council of 4th June, 1870, which inhibited the employment on public work of any person who had not obtained a certificate of educational fitness for clerical duties from the Civil Service Commissioners.

Notice appears to have been, henceforth, periodically given by the Commission that an examination would be held of persons desirous of obtaining such a certificate. The successful candidates were placed upon a register; and, upon the application of a department for clerical aid, the required hands were supplied by the Commission. They received the title of Writer, a term borrowed by the Commissioners from the India Office. The title was originally given by the East India Company to a class of scribes who were employed in the great counting-house in Leadenhall Street, to distinguish them from the clerks who were the officials of the Company. The term was applied by the Company both to its home service and to its Indian service, the officials in India

being designated Civil Servants; and it appears to have been retained by the India Office after the assumption of the government of India by the Crown, and to have passed from the India Office to the Civil Service Commission.

A register of the Writers having been retained by the Commission, they appear to have been detailed for duty in the public departments at the discretion of the Commission. Their pay, however, instead of being issued to them at the office of the Commissioners, appears to have been issued to each Writer by the department which was employing him at the time. The Writers thus became identified with the department which employed them; and to this, perhaps, may be ascribed all the disaffection and agitation which culminated in the election of a Committee of Grievances by the Writers, and led to Mr. Otway's motion in the House of Commons.

The First Report of Mr. Playfair's Commission recommends the retention of the services of this class, but suggests the substitution of the title Copyist for that of Writer. Now the term Writer appears to be one that is exactly applicable to the service required

of such persons. It has been in use, for the substratum of the most gigantic system of administration that was ever devised, from a period long antecedent to the days when Mr. Playfair's distinguished father went out to India. It expresses more clearly than the term Copyist the duties that may be required of persons of this class, such as entry in a register of the departmental No. given to a paper upon its receipt in an office, and similar work, besides the simple work of copying.

The Commission seems to recognise the title of the Writer class to Superannuation Allowance in virtue of their possession of a Civil Service Commissioners' certificate. Mr. Playfair defines such an allowance to be "postponed wages;" a somewhat incorrect definition of a pension, which is a reversion contingent on and during survivorship of a fixed period of service. "Postponed wages" accrue to the estate; any benefit of pension expires with the individual. The admission of such a title would appear to be not only a boon to the Writer class, but of advantage also to the public; as the concession would be the creation of a retaining fee for the call of the services of experienced Writers

when needed, and for the good conduct in private life of persons in this class, whose services may only at intervals be required, so as to preclude any damage by individual misconduct to the character of their order.

The Report advocates the employment of Boy and Man Writers. The adoption of this recommendation would hold out every prospect to a Writer, who had joined as a Boy Writer, of working out the service required of him to earn a Superannuation Allowance, if the suggestion for the award of pension be, likewise, carried out. But, for the formation of a Writer class with a prospect of service to earn a pension, it would be necessary that a muster-roll of the class should be permanently retained by some department of the public service; and, with a view to keeping Writers apart from the department to which they may be lent for such time as they may be required, it would appear desirable that their pay should be issued to them by the department which retains their muster-roll, and not by the department upon the work of which the Writer might be temporarily employed. The cost of his hire would, of course, be recovered

from the department which had employed the Writer, and form a charge upon the estimates of the expenditure of that department; but the issue of the pay of all Writers by a single department would enable it to keep a correct muster-roll of the persons available for the duties required of the class, and a correct record of the service of Writers, to regulate the economy of the class, and to consolidate it into an effective substratum of the Civil Service. Any further questions as to the pay and prospects of Writers, and further agitation of their grievances, would be thus effectually precluded.

The Report, however, of Mr. Playfair's Commission appears to complicate any grievances of the present class of Writers by recommending the creation of a Lower class of Clerks for the performance of duties hardly distinguishable from those of the Writer class, and composed, like the Writer class, of the two grades Boy and Man. The Writer class is to be an adjunct to the Civil Service; the Lower class of Clerks is to form a portion of the Civil Service. The pay of the Writer may reach a maximum of 1s. an hour, or £93 6s. a year; that of the Lower-class Clerk may

reach a maximum of £200 a year, or nearly 2s. 2d. an hour. The employment of the Writer is to be ephemeral; his eligibility for employment is to be acquired by his passing a test-examination by the Civil Service Commission. The employment of the Lower-class Clerk is to be permanent; his status is to be a vested interest acquired by success in a competitive examination. Both orders are to be liable "to serve in any department of the State to which they may from time to time be appointed or transferred." To these two classes all the rudimentary work in our public offices is to be delivered over. The suggestions of the Commissioners, for the creation of two substrata to the Civil Service of the Crown, have been, somewhat precipitately, carried out by the Order in Council of 12th February, 1876. The provisions of this Order appear to be mutually contradictory; and they conflict with the provisions of the Order in Council of 21st May, 1855, and with those of the Order in Council of 4th June, 1870, and likewise with the Report of Mr. Playfair's Commission.

Under the Order in Council of 4th June, 1870,

every person seeking employment as a Writer was required to obtain a certificate of qualification from the Civil Service Commissioners. It has been an open question till now whether, under the provisions of the Civil Service Superannuation Act of 1859, service to the public under the possession of a Civil Service Commissioner's certificate does not entitle Writers to pension. In the judgment of Mr. Playfair's Commission, as implied by its Report, a right to pension may be claimed by the present Writers. If such be the case, all these persons stand upon a common footing; and if any of their number be absorbed into the Lower class of Clerks, which alone is henceforth to be entitled to pension under the Order in Council of 12th February, 1876, the finding of the Playfair Commission is set at naught by the residue of their number being stripped of their right to earn a pension. Thus this Order conflicts equally with Mr. Playfair's Report and the Order in Council of 4th June, 1870, by sanctioning the admission of some of the Writers into the Lower class of Clerks and the exclusion of others from its pale.

This provision of the Order of 12th February, 1876,

offends yet more against the historic Order in Council of 21st May, 1855, which formally interdicted the future admission of any person into the Civil Service except through competition, and disqualified any act of admission by patronage. The provisions of this Order are reiterated and confirmed by that of 12th February, 1876; and yet the latter Order in its context directs a violation of those provisions by sanctioning the admission of persons to be Civil Servants, in the Lower class of Clerks, by selection from the Writers, that is to say, by patronage. The carrying out of the Order in Council of 12th February, 1876, will, consequently, have been the creation of a precedent for admission into the Civil Service by patronage, under which any future operation of the Order in Council of 21st May, 1855, determines.

Apart, however, from the question of injustice to such of the present Writers as may be excluded from the Lower class of Clerks, while others of their number are drafted into this class, and are thus converted into Civil Servants, the creation of two substrata to the Civil Service appears to be a measure eminently injudicious in every way. The vast

quantity of purely clerical work required to be performed in the execution of public business, renders the institution of an effective substratum to the Civil Service a very desirable measure, both on the grounds of efficiency and economy. The present Writer class appears qualified in every way to supply such a substratum, and to perform every duty that should be required of it. Their enrolment in a corps, of which the muster-roll should be retained and the pay issued by a single department of the State, would consolidate their formation into a well-defined substratum to the Civil Service. A stimulus might be readily found for their zeal by the occasional award of additional remuneration by a department in which a Writer may have given long or meritorious service, and which would be a departmental issue to the recipient. Such a class of *substratified* Writers would answer every object of relieving the Civil Service of purely clerical work, and the *cadre* of a department of supernumerary Civil Servants.

The social castes of the two orders of Writer and Lower-class Clerk, instituted under the recommendation of Mr. Playfair, can hardly fail to be identical.

The two classes will be employed upon work which will be almost, if not absolutely, the same, and, at least, upon work in which they will fail to understand any difference. The carrying on of public business must necessarily entail the performance of a vast amount of clerical work. To divorce such work from the duties of Civil Servants is to cut away their training, and to annihilate their efficiency. The ablest officials, even if they be men of long service, upon transfer to the duties of a section of public business to which they may be strangers, usually endeavour to acquire a mastery of its details by passing through a course of the simplest work in connection with their new duties, until, having attained a thorough and practical acquaintance with the work, they feel themselves competent, and justified in their own interests by the experience which they have thus obtained, to proceed to the direction of the public business intrusted to them. If persons of long official experience voluntarily resort to this system of self-training to new duties, it may be concluded that this method of acquiring efficiency in the discharge of public business is one that is specially

adapted for the training of young men upon their entry on an official career. Administrative efficiency, that is to say, knowledge of detail and accuracy, is only to be acquired by such a course of training and apprenticeship for years to official business. Even in training to the practice of the law, both in its higher and in its lower branches, it is the practice to communicate facility and precision to the student by his employment for a time on elementary work. Official duties embrace a study of the law and practice of the department and their application to its business. A practical training to public business is, consequently, far more necessary for a Civil Servant than for a barrister or a solicitor; and yet the Report of Mr. Playfair's Commission advocates the surrender of the work, by the performance of which alone such a practical training and efficiency are to be acquired by the Civil Servant who is to be intrusted with responsibility, to a Lower class of Clerks, who are to receive an initial salary of £80 a year, and be advanced by triennial increments to a maximum rate of pay of £200 a year.

The admission of laymen into this Lower class of

Civil Servants, for the performance of simply clerical work *in perpetuo*, and with such a modest rate of remuneration, by competition, appears to exaggerate the evil which an experience of twenty years of the application of competition to admission into the Civil Service proves to be an inevitable drawback to this system of obtaining Civil Servants. The struggle for existence, which grows fiercer daily in England, and the keen competition to obtain an opening in life and employment of any kind, have already enlisted, even into the Writer class, persons who feel themselves wrongly placed in its ranks. The son of perhaps one of the highest officials in a public department is frequently to be found serving, to obtain employment, as a Writer in his father's office. A due sense of distinction between the subordinate officials of different grades serving under the father is thus destroyed, and discipline itself is sapped. If this be the case already, the danger to discipline is hardly likely to be checked by the creation of a class of Civil Servants of inferior grade, entitled by status to assert superiority over, but employed upon the same work as the Writer, whose father may belong to the Upper

grade of the Civil Service. This, however, is a matter of internal organisation of a department, and may be obviated by a judicious allocation of *employés*. The evil of enlisting through competition into the Civil Service persons with culture and capacity too high for the work required to be performed, an evil which may result in the negligent performance of such work, cannot fail to be exaggerated by the creation of a low caste of Civil Servants; as, in the scarcity of appointments of the Upper grade, situations in the Lower class will be sought and will be won by superior men. An appointment won by competition, being a vested right, should offer such employment and such prospects to the holder as will preclude his considering it a college fellowship, and regarding it as a reward for past labour, and will be a guarantee to the public that the service which he will give will be conscientious and efficient. The creation of a vested interest, without such a guarantee, is a fine upon the community.

A liability to transfer to any department of the public service is fastened upon each person in the Lower class of Clerks; or, in other words, all such

persons are to be recruited for general service, and they are to form the rank and file of the Civil Service. If, however, any member of this Lower class of Civil Servants, while employed in a particular department, shall evince marked efficiency in its work, it is suggested by Mr. Playfair's Commission that such an *employé* should be awarded a special duty-pay, which shall invest him with non-commissioned rank, but shall not enrol him upon the *cadre* of the department, or release him from liability for general service for which he was recruited. This suggestion of the Commissioners obviously springs from a very imperfect knowledge of the system upon which an army is organised. In the army non-commissioned rank is not given by pay, but pay is acquired by non-commissioned rank. A soldier holding a non-commissioned rank in one corps, if he be transferred to another corps, carries his rank and his pay with him.

According to the scheme, however, of the Commissioners, one of the rank and file of the Civil Service may, in virtue of his aptitude for the work of a particular department, acquire, while serving in it, non-

commissioned pay and rank; but he is to continue transferable to another department, for the duties of which he may have no aptitude, or in which he must serve as one of the rank and file before he can acquire the efficiency which may procure him the pay and rank which he formerly held elsewhere. Thus, while in the army a man can only be reduced from his rank and pay for misconduct, non-commissioned pay and rank among the privates of the Civil Service are to be held only temporarily, and are to be liable to forfeiture at any moment, under the liability of the holder to transfer to another department of public business. It is not for a moment to be supposed that a wanton injury would be ever done to an efficient Lower-class Clerk by his relief of the duties which acquired for him non-commissioned pay and rank, and his transfer, without a public necessity, to some other department in which he would find himself less fortunately situated. But duties sometimes die out; and it is to meet a contingency of this kind that liability to general service is advocated as the condition of enlistment of recruits into the Lower class of Civil Servants.

A liability to mutual exchange is fastened upon all persons in this class by a strict proviso that none of the rank and file shall have any claim to go beyond a maximum of £200 a year in salary. But if a graduated scale of pay from £80 to £200 a year be awarded to the rank and file, it may happen that the surrender by a department of a man who receives £200 a year may lead to his being sent to a department for the work of which a man with the pay of £80 or £100 a year would have sufficed and been employed, if the man entitled to £200 a year had not been cast adrift. Thus the evil of over-payment for the class of work required to be given is perpetuated under the system of transfer of *employés* with a graduated scale of pay.

Under the proviso of a liability to general service attaching to the two orders of Writers and Lower-class Clerks, it is necessary that a muster-roll of each class of *employés* should be retained by some particular department. Under the Order in Council of 12th February, 1876, a roll of the Writers is to be retained by the Civil Service Commission; but no proviso in this respect is made in regard to the Lower-class Clerks, who are to be equally transferable. The

legitimate duty, however, of that Commission is to test and ascertain the educational capacity of recruits for the Civil Service, and not to post men to departments or farm out hands. The doctor who examines a recruit is required to pronounce on his physical fitness for service; and he might, very reasonably, object to being required to exceed his functions by supervising the posting of men, upon enlistment and throughout their service, to different corps. The Civil Service Commission was chartered for the examination of candidates for the Civil Service, and not for the regulation of the staffs of public departments, or the management of the supply to them in succession of interchangeable labour, or their relief of surplus hands. To the imposition of all these duties upon the Commission there lies the objection that any intermingling of duties, entirely distinct in character from each other, invariably entails a breakdown. Efficiency of administration is only secured by different duties being carried out through distinct channels.

It is undoubtedly necessary that a muster-roll of the two classes of Writers, Man and Boy, and one

likewise of the two classes of the rank and file of the Civil Service, Man and Boy, if the Lower class of Clerks is to be thus subdivided, should be retained by some one department of the State for the purpose of regulating the *cadre* of each class of *employés*, allocating them for service, and issuing their pay. A section of the Privy Council Office, as it is the fountain-head of all administration in this country, might perhaps be, legitimately, intrusted with these duties. They appear to have been delegated, under the provisions of the Order in Council of 12th February, 1876, to the Commission which was instituted for the examination of candidates for admission into the Civil Service.

The Report of the Commission recommends that the privilege of competing for admission into the Upper grade of the Civil Service should be only conceded to an aspirant after he shall have successfully passed a preliminary test as to educational fitness at any one of four examinations which, the Commission recommends, should be held during the year in London, Edinburgh, and Dublin. It offers no opinion as to whether, at such a competitive examination, the Oxford University system, of admitting to the list of

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passed candidates all who may have reached a fixed standard, should be applied; or whether the Cambridge system of pure competition and fixed *minimum* test should be adopted.

The most able administrator, perhaps, that the public service, imperial or Indian, has ever known; the official who, by virtue solely of his powers of mind, passed from local administration in India to place himself at the very head of imperial administration, much as the late Lord Lytton described Charles Dickens to have done, in the case of letters, in emerging abruptly from obscurity and placing himself at the very summit of English literature, has pronounced in unqualified terms in favour of the Cambridge system. The opinion of one so eminent, and so universally recognized within the official pale as the clearest intellect that has ever been brought to bear upon public administration in this country, as Sir Charles Trevelyan, requires but its mention to command support for the application to the competitive examination, for admission into the Upper grade of the Civil Service, of the system "of taking up to such a number as might be required

those who obtained the greatest aggregate of marks."

The open professions offer far higher prizes than the Civil Service can by any possibility be made to do. The Service of the Crown can only be a career of security and of social distinction. The former will consequently always draft off "the flower of the youth of the country." But the application of pure competition to the admissions into the scientific corps of the army appears to have had the happy results of sparing "the flower of the youth of the country" to the open professions, and elevating the standard of the education of the officers of the Royal Artillery and the Royal Engineers to the requirements of their profession. These corps do not appear, upon a comparison of the Army List of the year 1876 with that of the year 1855, to have suffered from any depreciation in point of the social caste of their officers. The social degree of the youth who win admission into the Royal Military Academy appears to be the same as, if not superior to, that of the officers who held the commissions in our scientific corps when admissions into the Academy were ob-

tained by nomination. The intellectual vigour and culture of the officers of these corps have kept pace with the marvellous strides of science during the last twenty years; and the result of the application of pure competition to these corps may, consequently, be said to have been that it has led to the selection only of such minds for scientific military service as would be equal to every strain that it might cast upon them.

A similar result appears to have followed upon the application of pure competition to admissions into the Civil Service. During the last twenty years the State has assumed the administration of most of its business, in supersession of the obsolete practice of letting out the discharge of public business to farmers. A consolidated system of public administration has sprung into existence, and it appears to have enlisted into the public service a portion of the youth of the community who are in no way socially inferior to the *employés* who formerly filled the public offices, and who have, at the outset of their career, given sterling evidence of mental vigour and capacity.

Under the system of patronage these offices were,

to a great extent, filled by connections of members of the Government, who in those times were more frequently members of the patrician order than Ministers have latterly been. If, then, the Civil Servants of our day, who have won their careers by pure competition, be equal in social degree to the clerks to the Ministers of earlier times, and also equal to greater responsibilities than were formerly intrusted to the Civil Service, it is a fair inference that pure competition has succeeded not only in giving greater efficiency to the administrative staff of the nation, but in raising also the standard of education of the *haute volée.*

If it should prove further successful in filtering the youth of our upper classes through the Civil Service of the nation, and thus educating them practically for assuming in riper years the conduct of its business, public gratitude will be, doubly, due to such men as Sir Charles Trevelyan and Sir Stafford Northcote for having increased the efficiency of public administration and contributed materially to the higher culture of the upper strata of society. Such an aim, however, is hardly likely to be furthered by the adoption

of the recommendations of Mr. Playfair's Commission in respect to the pay and careers of Civil Servants.

It must be borne in mind that the title by which, under the system of admission by competition, a commission in the Army and an appointment in the Civil Service are held, is one of proved superiority of parts and attainments under tests applied by the State. In the case of the soldiery, varied travel affords a scope for the development of their powers, and for the application of their attainments. In the Civil Service fixity of station and shortness of tether allow no such scope. Slowness of promotion and smallness of pay engender repining and discontent equally in both careers. Moving about the world, however, may wear away such feelings in one service. No such anodyne is within reach of the Civil Servant. The principle laid down by Gibbon for regulating the pay of the soldiery, that "with the military order, their modesty in peace and service in war are best secured by an honourable poverty," will not apply to the official, upon whom too, as a man of order, it is incumbent that he should marry and accept the burthens incidental to that state of life.

A salary of £400 a year, after twenty years' service, with no prospect of advancement except under accidental circumstances, is hardly an adequate return for the outlay upon the education, the study, and the toil which may have won a man the first place of some ten or twenty candidates in a competitive examination for admission into the service of the nation, at least in times when far better pay and prospects are tendered by mercantile firms to clerks with any educational capacity as linguists or otherwise for the business of the firm.

This, however, is the *maximum* pay which, in the opinion of Mr. Playfair's Commission, should be within the reach of the Civil Servant, with a possibility, or rather an offchance, of obtaining in addition duty-pay, the award of which to a Civil Servant is an admission to him of his inadequate remuneration. The recommendation appears to be based upon a comparison made by the Commissioners between the hours of attendance in our public departments and the working-hours of private firms, and upon a further comparison of the description of the work performed in public offices with that of the work done in clear-

ing-houses and the offices of railway companies, banks, insurance companies, and law-firms.

The Commissioners appear to have failed to learn, in the course of their inquiry, the standing law of the public service (a law laid down by supreme authority under the Sign Manual of the Sovereign, and daily applied), that official hours are not indicated by the hands of a clock. The whole time of a Civil Servant is at the command of the country, when required for the public service. The hours of attendance in public offices are generally fixed at 10 A.M. to 4 P.M., as sufficient, under ordinary circumstances, for the discharge of the current public business, and to fall in with the general arrangements of the community.

The work of an official is not to be measured by his attendance on duty; but his attendance on duty is to be measured by the business which he is required to discharge. His service of the public is *in perpetuo*, until he is worn out and pensioned. It is only in the case of a daily attendance on service much and habitually in excess of the ordinary period of duty that, strictly speaking, duty-pay is justifiable, as such

extra service effects, probably, the saving of the salary of another official.

The duties, too, of the subordinate *employés* in public offices will hardly admit of any comparison with the work of clearing-houses, banks, and similar institutions. Mechanical labour *per se* is mechanical labour, whether it be applied to making out a grocer's bill, a customer's bank-book, a lawyer's bill of costs, or a statement of the revenue and expenditure for the information of Parliament. Simple writing is the work of a Writer ; and for its performance persons should be employed at the rates of pay given in banks and similar institutions. The position of a Civil Servant implies a certain degree of confidence in him on the part of the public, and a reliance by his superiors upon his conscientious discharge of his duty to the public. For an accurate measure of the pay which should attach to such a capacity, the Commissioners should have referred to the rates of remuneration, which are but too gladly offered by business firms to any person whom they require for any post of trust, or one in which the firm must rely upon the integrity of the *employé*, rather than to

the rates paid by clearing-houses and insurance offices.

Apart, however, from such considerations, it must be borne in mind that a person who enters the service of the private institutions, to the business of which the Commission ventures to compare the carrying out of "the collective action of the nation," is at the time of his admission barely lettered, and is only required to be able to read and write and know a little of figures. He receives his education for his work after he has passed into the service of his employers; and thus, for such work as he gives, he receives pay, and education which he intends to carry elsewhere. During the time that he is being thus requited for his service, he is ever on the watch for opportunities of engaging himself to rival establishments, or starting upon his own account, throwing over his employers, and wresting their business from them. Except in the case of utter incapacity, the *employé* in private service forces his advancement in countless ways, after having made his start in life without any immaterial capital of education, or any outlay upon its acquisition. The persons to be found

at the age of thirty-five employed as clerks in banks and the service of law-firms are of the capacity and educational attainments of the Writer class in the public service.

A clerkship in a Government office is acquired by title of superiority of parts and education at the time of admission into the Civil Service. The *employé*, by the acceptance of his appointment, places his culture and his powers at the command of the community, to apply them in its service; and for his work he receives only pay, and not education and pay combined. He looks to advancement in life in the service of a single employer. It is a wrong to the community, and it is an injustice to the *employé*, if, in lieu of his powers being utilized in the service of the country, the career of work, to which he has consecrated his ability and his culture from the outset of life, be thwarted, and if he be compelled to consider his appointment as simply a place, or as a pension to youth for having toiled to acquire the education of its intelligence. A system of patronage may afford every facility for the creation of a system of life-billets for mendicants; the great Act of State of the year 1855

was supposed to have determined the practice of quartering them on the public exchequer. The result of the passing of that Act appears, so far, to have been the creation of a vast system of State endowments, as rewards to the youth of the country for having acquired mental culture which is to be only wasted, or at least to lie idle; in so far as the service of the community is concerned.

An official belongs entirely to the Service, quite as much as a soldier. The only excuse that can pass for his doing aught else besides his official work is the fact of his being compelled to resort to extraneous labour to enable him to procure the means of supporting his family. Under such a necessity, every apology may be offered for the *employés* who find themselves obliged to resort to somewhat questionable expedients for eking out a very inadequate stipend from the State by keeping market-gardens, shops, coal and house-agency offices. Such practices have long been in vogue in what are called the East-End offices. The usual resource in West-End offices appears to have been to obtain directorships of companies, until the practice was checked by an

inhibition from the Government. The report of Mr. Playfair's Commission suggests the award to the Civil Service of an uniform rate of pay, commencing at £100 and rising by triennial increments of £50 to a maximum of £400 a year, with a contingency of extra pay in sums of £50, £100, and £200 a year for discharge of special duties, and a remote possibility of advancement to what is termed by the Commissioners a Staff appointment.

The object of the application of competition to the admissions into the Civil Service of the Crown is, obviously, the enlistment of ability into the nation's service. The result of its application must necessarily be to recruit men of superior energy and capacity. Persons at the time of life of candidates are not, as a rule, foreseeing; and, in general, they are somewhat straitened in means. Under the most favourable circumstances of an easy home, it is gratifying to a youth to have obtained a small independence in a Government appointment; and he may be forgiven, upon the plea of his inexperience, for not realizing at the time that his future must prove a disappointment of the hopes with which, under the glow of a first

success, he entered the service of the nation. The disappointment, however, cannot fail to be reciprocal.

Under the discontent which a sense of disappointment must engender, any utility which may be expected from the ability of an *employé* will be effectually marred. Compelled, by the scantiness of his pay, to resort to other work for the purpose of eking out his means, he will surrender to it the best of his parts and the most of his energy. Under his fixity of tenure of his place, he will consider the business of the public a secondary consideration; and he will reserve himself, in the main, for the private work which he will create for himself.

The mental calibre of the persons who win admission into the Civil Service by competition must necessarily render them more gamesters than gamblers. They cannot fail to deem the uncertain contingency of the duty-pay, held out by Mr. Playfair as a bait for their zeal in the public service, too speculative a gain for them to waste their days in idly discounting it; they will employ their energies upon matters that will yield a sure return; and, for an increase of their official income, they will rely

upon a periodical recurrence of the necessity, under which Mr. Canning found himself in the year 1809, of an award of "a special augmentation of salary in consideration of length of service." Duty-pay to an official, under the conditions of his career, is simply an admission to him of his inadequate remuneration. In recommending its award, the Commissioners advocate the commission and the perpetuation of an injustice by the State, coupled with an acknowledgment of the wrong to the *employé*.

The scheme of Mr. Playfair, for the creation of two orders in the Civil Service, is one of reversion to the Indian system of a Covenanted and an Uncovenanted service. It retains for the Lower grade a brand of inferiority, while it concedes to that class all the credit that may result from competitive success, the fixity of tenure, the graduated scale of pay, the right to pension, and the status of a Civil Servant. The very pith and marrow of an efficient system of public administration lie in the inducement of a high tone and strong *esprit de corps* between persons in the service. The official who succeeds in maintaining discipline without asserting it; and who creates such an influence

around him that his staff imperceptibly defer to his authority, without his ever invoking it, is ever the ablest and safest administrator. A department of State should be an arena for the mutual cultivation of courteous relations by the *employés*, and, under their influence, of a spirited discharge of duties to the public. Government is a system, and for its effective working all its constituents should be in mutual harmony. Such an orderly state of things may be somewhat difficult of accomplishment if a public office be reduced to the level of a parade-ground, upon which distinctions of grades in the official hierarchy are to be intruded, at each step, upon the active discharge of public business.

Under the public system prevailing in Great Britain, it is indispensable that the high posts in the permanent service of the nation should be left at the disposal of the Ministers of the Crown. A Cabinet is indebted for its existence to its supporters in Parliament; and it must have at its command the ways and means of requiting its supporters. The superior appointments under the Crown, the Under Secretaryships of State, the Commissionerships, and

the posts defined by the 22 Vic. c. 26 as belonging to the first class of the Civil Service, are fair prizes for the lower class of politicians, who may be wanting in the capacity or the ambition which alone can force a way to the great Ministerial posts and the supreme control of administration. If any of these appointments be won by a member of the permanent Civil Service, the promotion must mark the possession of transcendent merit, as in the case of Sir William Stephenson, Mr. Farrer, and other distinguished Civil Servants, who have early singled themselves out in the great battle of life, and proved themselves to be gifted with such high ability that it makes them tower above their order.

A sufficient flow of promotion to satisfy every wish and to stimulate all the zeal of the Civil Service could be readily devised by the application to it of the system of tenure of Staff appointments which has been adopted for the Army, coupled with a modification of the Superannuation Act of 1859.

Until the year 1858 Staff appointments in the Military Service were held for life. The stimulus given to the education of officers by the adoption of com-

petitive examinations for commissions, and the establishment of the Staff College for the higher education of the soldiery, led to a change in the period of tenure of Staff appointments. The number of highly-educated officers in the Army became so large, that, with a view to affording them in turn opportunities of higher work and pay than are afforded by regimental duty, the practice of life-tenure of Staff appointments was determined; and it was laid down as a law that such appointments should be held for a period of five years only, and that the holder, on expiry of his five years of service on the Staff, should revert to regimental duty and pay until an opportunity should offer for his translation to a Staff appointment of a higher grade than that of the one which he previously held.

The number of *employés*, of high educational attainments and capacity, in the Civil Service of the Crown, is now so large that the application of a five-years' tenure of superior appointments appears an equal necessity in the Civil as in the Military Service of the nation. Corruption underlies stagnation. Under our present system of life-billets, which is a relic of the

obsolete system of places created by patronage, there would appear to be little or no promotion in the imperial service, except under periodical reorganizations of departments, and the enforced retirement of the seniors by abolition of office, which is a very expensive mode of relieving the Service of the aged and infirm. In the Indian Civil Service, the craving to return home acts as a strong incentive to retirement at the earliest moment of his pension being within the reach of the *employé*; and it, thus, creates an ever-ceaseless flow of promotion. No inducement of the kind operates in the case of the Civil Service in this country; and, as retirement is not compulsory at any prescribed age, an official, who has long risen to be the head of a department, may subside in harness from senility into the grave.

The provisions of the Superannuation Act of 1859 accord a recognition to different grades in the Civil Service by the award to them of extra years, in addition to the service which may have been given by the retiring official, in the computation of his superannuation allowance. A pension is calculated at one-sixtieth of the pay of the post for each year of ser-

vice; and the maximum is limited to forty-sixtieths of such pay. Under Treasury interpretation of the provisions of this statute, a Civil Servant of the First class is entitled to the addition to his service of an extra period ranging from ten to twenty years; a Civil Servant of the Second class to the addition of a period of seven years; and a Civil Servant of the Third class to the addition of a period of five years.

The extension of this principle more generally to the Civil Service, if coupled with the abolition of the limit of forty-sixtieths in the award of a pension, would lead to a freer flow of promotion, and, if applied to Staff appointments under the condition of a five-years' tenure, would compensate the holder for the abridged enjoyment of his post. Thus, if £800 a year were rated as the *maximum* salary of the Civil Service, and every appointment with a higher rate of pay were made a Staff appointment tenable for a period of five years only, but entitled to reckon seven and a half years for each such quinquennial period of service in the computation of the superannuation allowance of the official, a Civil Servant, who had given a service of thirty years in the lower

grade and one of two quinquennial periods on the Staff, would reckon forty-five years towards pension, and be entitled to a retiring allowance of forty-five sixtieths of his pay of £800 a year, or to a total pension of £600 a year.

Having had the advantage of an official training and discipline, he would return to social life with the advantage, in addition to his pension, of having held a high position in the public service, and thus acquired a standing in the world. His age would probably be sixty; and he would, consequently, be at a time of life when he would be at the maturity of his powers, and qualified by training, position, and years to assume the management of private associations, and accept higher individual responsibilities and their advantages than he could ever hope to obtain in the service of the public. Every inducement would, thus, be offered to him to retire, without retirement being made compulsory, at the age of sixty. He would be in receipt of the pension of a general officer of the scientific corps, he would have attained an official position corresponding to the military rank of a person who had entered the Military Service of the Crown, and his

service would have been commensurate with that usually given in the scientific corps for the attainment of the rank and pension of a general officer.

But, to place the two Services, Civil and Military, upon a common footing in respect to the rewards of the Services, it is necessary that some concession should be made to the Civil Service by the award to it of the pensions for widows and orphans, which are granted to the Military Service; or, that some consideration in lieu of such grants, in the shape of a higher rate of pay than is granted to the soldiery, should be assigned to Civil Servants.

Under the Royal Warrant of 27th December, 1870, the following scale of pensions is laid down for the widows and orphans of officers :—

	General Officer.	Colonel.	Lieut. Colonel.	Major.	Captain.	Lieutenant.	Sub-Lieutenant.
	£	£	£	£	£	£	£
Widow	120	100	80	70	50	40	36
Each Orphan	16 to 20	14 to 16	14 to 16	12 to 14	9 to 12	5 to 10	5 to 10

The maximum amount of allowances assignable to the family of a deceased officer is fixed by this Royal Warrant at £300 a year in the case of the family of

a general officer; and, in the case of the family of a deceased officer of a lower grade, at the amount of his half-pay.

These rates of pension for the families of officers are not extravagant; and their concession to the families of Civil Servants would be but a measure of justice to them. The total cost of pensions for the families of deceased officers is estimated for the year 1876 at £131,119, a sum of £106,412 representing the pensions of widows, and a sum of £24,707 representing the compassionate allowances of orphans. A pension of a widow is, of course, granted for life, or during widowhood; a compassionate allowance to the orphan of an officer is payable, in the case of a son, only until he attains the age of eighteen, and, in the case of a daughter, until she attains the age of twenty-one or marries.

The cost to the public of the concession of these rates of pension to the families of Civil Servants would, probably, be much less than the expense of the pensions granted to the families of military officers, as the periods of duration of such pensions would, in most instances, be very much shorter in

the case of the family of a Civil Servant than in that of the family of a military officer, and but few orphans of Civil Servants would come within the provisions of the Royal Warrant in respect of age.

It is obvious that a flow of promotion that shall satisfy the fair expectations of persons, who have won careers in the Civil Service of the country, as rewards of success under competitive tests applied by the State, can only be created by the assimilation of careers and prospects in the Civil to the careers and prospects in the Military Service of the country. In the year 1855, the nation decided upon assuming into its own hands the conduct of its business and of creating an administration for the discharge of that business. In accordance with the principle of government laid down by Mr. Mill, the nation elected to recruit into its service the highest intelligence and education of the youth of the country that it could command. It remains for the nation to carry out the obligation which it incurred of giving careers in its service to the youth, now ripened into manhood, whom it induced to enter its service.

It would appear that such careers can only be

created by the establishment of clear hierarchies, in imitation of the Indian system, for the several lines of public administration; such as a hierarchy for the administration of the *fiscus* for all departments of public revenue under the Treasury, a hierarchy for internal administration under the Home Department, a combined hierarchy for warlike administration by land and sea, a hierarchy for marine and trade administration under the President of the Board of Trade, a general hierarchy under the Department of the Privy Council for all other sections of public business, with the exception of the General Post Office, which, being an institution of public utility rather than of revenue or State administration, may claim an administration of its own devising, and of the Foreign Office, which is but little more than a Record Office for our Diplomatic and Consular Services, and has been already converted into the headquarters of these Services. The days of the Colonial Office are probably numbered. The confederation of our South African dependencies may, possibly, determine the existence of a separate Colonial Department of State; and, as history repeats itself, under a revival of the

Royal Order in Council of the 21st December, 1672, the remnant of our Colonial administration may revert erelong to the immediate discharge of the department of the Privy Council.

The adoption of such a system of administrative hierarchies for the several lines of public business would fall in with the views of some eminent members of the Civil Service who advocate a priority of claim on the part of their sons for admission into that particular department of public administration in which the father may have had a distinguished career. Their views, too, might further be met by the application, to admissions into a department, of the German system under which a cadet, after having passed his examination and won his commission, is required to obtain his acceptance by the commanding officer of the corps, which he wishes to join, into its brotherhood of officers. The candidate for an official career would, thus, be enabled to elect, in the first instance, the line of public administration in which he would wish to serve. Having made his selection, he would present himself at any competitive examination that was announced for appointments in that particular

hierarchy of State administration; and, having passed successfully, he would approach the chief of any particular department of that hierarchy, which he might be anxious of joining, to accept him in his office, and obtain the latter's acquiescence, before making his final election of his department.

The formation of such a system of administrative hierarchies would, too, materially facilitate the application of the principle of rendering subordinate officials interchangeable. The initial salary and the rate of pay during the first ten years of service would be about the same in all the departments that would constitute each administrative hierarchy. A transfer of subordinate *employés* from one department to another could, consequently, be easily effected during the first decade of service, and would answer every object in view of economizing the time of *employés*, as well as of affording them opportunities of acquiring experience.

A period of twenty years has now elapsed since the reconstitution of the Civil Service of the Crown under the historic Order in Council of 21st May, 1855. The *employés* in our public departments who

survive to the present time from a date prior to the reconstitution of the public service, appear to be the main obstacles to an effective reorganization of public administration on a sound basis, and the creation of an orderly career for subordinate public officials. Advanced by length of service to the chief posts in the several departments, or disappointed of such advancement and left in humbler stations, with salaries increased by length of service to rates of pay possibly too high for the class of work performed by the holders, it becomes an economic question, though one easy of solution, whether a saving would not ensue to the public exchequer by the award of liberal rates of superannuation allowance to such *employés* of long standing at this period to induce them to retire from the public service.

The statute 22 Vic. c. 26 limits the award of superannuation allowances, even in cases of abolition of office, to forty-sixtieths of the official's pay. The present is, however, an exceptional moment, and would justify the passing of a statute conceding to retiring officials the full rates of pension that would accrue under clause 7 of the Superannuation Act of

1859 (22 Vic. c. 26) without the limit of forty-sixtieths. A step of this kind, as it would, probably, succeed in relieving public departments of a very large number of officials of long standing, and thus reducing the annual cost of administration, would materially facilitate the carrying out of the reorganization of the imperial Civil Service, which the Government has announced that it has in contemplation. It must be borne in mind that the surrender of the limit of forty-sixtieths of pay, in the award of a pension to an official retiring at this moment, partakes more of the character of a final payment by the nation to get rid of the last remnant of the system of places, which system the nation determined in the year 1855, than of a concession to the Civil Service.

The reorganization of that Service is a measure of practical statesmanship, one that the nation will see carried out with every sense of satisfaction. An enormous annual expenditure upon the administrative staff of a department, an expenditure obviously in excess of the legitimate cost of the conduct of public business, is a waste of the money of taxpayers, and one to which they may, reasonably, take exception. The grati-

tude of the country, as well as of the Civil Service and the recognition of history will be the recompense of the Minister who can command the requisite energy and capacity to deal practically with this great question of State. The nation, now that its attention has been drawn to the subject by the agitation within the Civil Service, the discussions in Parliament, and the reports of the Inquiry Commission of 1875, asks—

τίς δαὶ θεὸς
Πολιοῦχος ἔσται; τῷ ξανοῦμεν τὸν πέπλον;

Sir Stafford Northcote has had a long and a practical experience of the working of administration, and earned universal consideration and the gratitude of the community by the high ability and conscientiousness with which, in conjunction with Sir Charles Trevelyan, he broke down the old barriers that hemmed in the service of the Crown, and threw public employment open to the nation. Lord Hampton has had the supreme administration of the three most responsible departments of the State, and, having given sterling evidence of the ability of his

stewardship of each, in the high degree of efficiency to which his administration succeeded in raising each of the great departments placed in turn under his direction, his acceptance of the post of First Civil Service Commissioner justifies every hope of his equally successful reorganization of public administration. In addition to such a title to public confidence, Lord Hampton appears to have possessed the singular felicity of being able to win the personal loyalty of the staff of each department over which he has presided; and his acceptance of the duty of the reorganization of the Civil Service is a guarantee to the Service and to the country that the success which has attended each stage of his eminent career will receive a crowning finish in the formation of an efficient and well-knit system of conduct of public business.

But, for an effective reorganization of our public departments, something more is needed than the simple adoption of the recommendations made by Mr. Playfair's Commission after a very desultory inquiry into the circumstances of our public administration. The appointment, perhaps, of a Royal

Commission to report fully to the Estates upon the present and the future of the Civil Service of the Crown, would be the most effective step towards dealing in a practical and a vigorous manner with so momentous a question, a question that touches the purse of the nation as well as affecting the future conduct of its business. It is time that a consolidated and clearly-defined system of public administration should be given to the country; a system that shall offer careers to such units of the community, as may aspire to the privilege of serving the country, and render that service an object of ambition to the most gifted of the youth of the nation.

THE END.

BILLING AND SONS, PRINTERS, GUILDFORD, SURREY.